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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
NANCY S. HAGER, aka
NANCY C. STALLINGS,
*

Appeals No. 890725-CA

*

Civil No.

Plaintiff/Respondent,
874902628

vs.
JAMES RONALD HAGER, SR.,
Defendant/Appellant.
SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENTS

Several times throughout her brief the Plaintiff makes
the allegation that the Defendant refused to list the parties
marital home as required by the Decree of Divorce.

Plaintiff

attempts to make this allegation a believable, factual conclusion.
However, this allegation is neither factual
representation of fact.

nor an accurate

Neither the parties Stipulation nor the

Decree of Divorce place the onus of listing the former marital home
on the Defendant. Rather, the obligation to list the home for sale
is the clear responsibility of both parties.

(Paragraph 7, Decree

of Divorce.) The truth is that the Defendant did list the marital
home for sale in absolute compliance with paragraph seven

(7) of

the Decree of Divorce. This listing was with Merrill Lynch Realty
Relocation, the company utilized by the Defendant's employer to
purchase the homes of transferred employees. The two (2) Order to
3

Show Cause proceedings initiated by the Plaintiff were little more
than impermissible attempts to force the Defendant to act in a
manner more closely palatable to the way she believed events should
occur, regardless of the fact that the premises for the relief she
was seeking were unfounded and not supported by the Decree of
Divorce.

Additionally, as has been amply demonstrated

in the

Defendant's brief, the Defendant was attempting to negotiate a sale
of the home with the relocation company until May 4, 1989.
The Plaintiff also makes note of several opportunities
the Defendant may have had to either negotiate differently the
terms of the Decree of Divorce or to file objections to the Order
to Show Cause hearing which was held on March 27, 1989. This Court
should be aware that the Defendant did not have counsel either
during the negotiation of the divorce nor at the first Order to
Show Cause hearing.

The Defendant, to his detriment, relied upon

representations made by counsel for Plaintiff when agreeing to the
terms of the divorce.

Moreover, he was unaware that he had the

right to appeal from the ruling issued by Commissioner Peuler ca
March 27, 1989.
The Defendant takes issue to the statement made by the
Plaintiff that no objections were made on October 17, 1989 to the
fact that there was going to be no evidentiary hearing on that
date.

Objections were made.

However, this issue shall be

addressed at a later date in the Defendant's reply brief.
The Defendant believes that any reliance upon Rule 70 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is an erroneous misapplication
4

of the Rule. As will be discussed more fully later in this brief,
Rule 70 is applicable to the conveyances of property but not to the
division of net sales proceeds realized from the sale of real
property.

DETAIL OF THE REPLY ARGUMENTS

I.

THE TRIAL COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE IT ORDERS

AND JUDGMENTS BY ENTERING FURTHER JUDGMENT TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC
REMEDIES WHEN A PARTY FAILS TO COMPLY WITH PRIOR ORDERS OR
JUDGMENTS.
As a matter of black letter law the Defendant has no quarrel
with the statement "The trial Court has authority to enforce its
orders and judgments by entering further judgment to provide
specific remedies when a party fails to comply with prior orders
or judgments."

However, this power is not absolute.

Nor can the

Court's authority be utilized to modify or alter existing judgments
sua sponte.

The Defendant takes issue with the Plaintiff's

analysis of the statement of black letter law and the Plaintiff's
application of the statement of black letter law to this case. A
further discussion

of the proper application

of the Court's

authority shall follow after correction of other misleading and
erroneous statements made by the Plaintiff on pages 8 through 11
inclusive, of the Plaintiff's brief.
It is misleading for the Plaintiff to contend that the
Defendant's employer purchases or did purchase the residences of
5

relocated

employees

for fair market value.

Residences were

purchased at prices agreed upon between the relocation company and
the sellers. It is not necessarily true that all transactions were
at fair market value.

These parties, in the past,

had rejected

offers made by a relocation company in conjunction with other
transfers. With reference to the home owned by the parties in Salt
Lake County, Utah it is important to realize that the parties
rejected the relocation company's offered sales price as it was not
indicative of the fair market value of the home.
It is erroneous and misleading for the Plaintiff to
continue to insist that the listing date and sale date were
synonymous.

The Defendant has adequately explained what his

understanding of paragraph seven (7) of the Decree of Divorce was.
Certainly, the parties understood and agreed that they would first
see if the employer's relocation company would purchase their home
and real property at an agreed upon price.

These parties each

knew, from past experience, that negotiations for the purchase of
a transferred employee's home commenced after the relocation was
initiated.
listing

Both parties also knew that the entire process of

the home with

the relocation

company, obtaining

the

necessary inspections, and appraisals required in excess of sixty
(60) days1 time.
There, however, is no absolute mandate the parties home
had to be sold to the relocation company.

This is precisely one

of the facets of the argument presented at the Order to Show Cause
hearing, at the short meeting with Judge Moffat, and on appeal.
6

Additionally,

if the

Plaintiff

were

totally

factual

in her

representations and arguments she would realize that the Defendant
has sought clarification of who is responsible for the mortgage
payments after September 30, 1988. The fact that paragraph seven
(7) of the Decree of Divorce

is ambiguous is not the fault of the

Defendant.

The Defendant was without representation when the

Stipulation

and

the

final

divorce

documents

were

drafted.

Plaintiff and her attorney drafted the documents. The ambiguity is
their fault and if anyone is to be penalized by any ambiguity it
should be Plaintiff.
On page nine

(9) of her brief the Plaintiff states

"Defendant asserts that he did list the residence with Merrill
Lynch Relocation Services, but there is no evidence to support his
contention."

If there had been no listing with Merrill Lynch

Relocation Services there would have been no appraisals paid for
by Merrill Lynch Relocation Services and certainly there would have
been no purchase offer.

This statement is so patently false it

borders on being offensive.
The Plaintiff maintains on page ten (10) of her brief
that she is not a record owner of the real property and the
Defendant is the only record owner of the residence. Defendant has
submitted as attachments to his brief copies of the Trust Deed
which were negotiated when the parties1 home in Salt Lake County,
Utah, was purchased.

The Trust Deed and all the closing documents

indicate that the home was purchased jointly by the Plaintiff and
Defendant.

The Warranty Deed states the house was owned by James

7

R« Hager, Sr., a married man. The parties believed (the Defendant
still believes) this deed evidences a joint tenancy ownership with
his former spouse.

The Defendant was not represented by counsel

at the Order to Show Cause hearing wherein it was determined that
the Defendant was the owner of the parties1 home. While this legal
conclusion was not challenged by the Defendant on appeal because
he did not realize he had the right to do so, it is currently
disputed as the Defendant and counsel seriously doubt the finding
is accurate. Moreover, at some future point if a listing agreement
is executed counsel for the Defendant believes that a real estate
broker

will

request

and

require the signatures

of both the

Plaintiff and the Defendant on any listing agreement.

The fact

that the Plaintiff later chose to file a lis pendens against the
property only muddied the negotiations between the parties and the
relocation company and will continue to cloud the title on this
property thus delaying, if not precluding, conveyance to a third
party buyer.
The Defendant fails to understand any of the arguments
advanced by the Plaintiff that he has ever acted in anything other
than good faith.

Of specific confusion is the argument made on

page eleven (11) of the Plaintiff's brief that the appraisals done
by Mr. Mulcock and Mr. Holt verify a lack of good faith by the
Defendant in his efforts to sell the parties1 home.

Certainly,

these appraisals do state that the parties1 home was not listed for
sale as of rhe date of the appraisals in 1988.
Plaintiff

is willfully

and

erroneously
8

However, the

misinterpreting

these

statements.

The home was listed for sale with the relocation

company. The reference that the home is not listed for sale simply
is an indication that the home is not listed with a licensed real
estate broker conducting business in Salt Lake County, Utah nor
does

it

appear

that

in

the

Salt

Lake

County

Multi-listing

Directory. This is not any indication that the home was not listed
for sale and that negotiations for the actual sale of the home were
not being conducted.
The Plaintiff misconstrues, misapplies and convolutes
Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Certainly, there is
no argument that the parties were to list the home for sale. This
is the only specific act required of the parties pursuant to
paragraph seven (7) of Decree of Divorce.

If indeed, the Court

could conclude that the listing agreement had not been executed
then the only option permissible to the trial court under the
directive of Rule 70 is to empower another party, arguably the
Plaintiff, to execute a listing agreement with a real estate broker
licenced to do business in Salt Lake County, Utah and to empower
the Plaintiff to effectuate the sale of the home to a bona fide
purchaser for fair market value.

Rule 70 does not empower the

trial court to modify or amend the Decree of Divorce and convert
the Plaintiff's speculative net equity interest into a monetary
judgment.

Both Commissioner Peuler and Judge Moffat far exceeded

the authority of a trial court to enforce its orders and far
exceeded the specific authority granted the trial court by Rule 70
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
9

The Defendant would request that this Appellant Court
carefully consider the language of K. M. Young and Associate v.
Cieslik, 675 P.2d 793 (Hawaii App. 1983), a case cited by the
Plaintiff on page twelve

(12) of her brief.

In the afore-

referenced case the Appellate Court of Hawaii states:
"Relief granted by a court of equity is discretionary
and will not be overturned on review unless trial court
abused its discretion by issuing decision that clearly
exceeded bounds of reason or disregarded rules or
principles of law or practice to substantial detriment
of the appellant."
Commissioner Peuler and Judge Moffat both clearly exceeded the
bounds of reason and principles of law as they modified and amended
the parties1 Decree of Divorce. The actions of the trial court are
in clear contradiction to the rulings in Lea v. Bowers, 658 P.2d
1213 (Utah 1983), Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, (UT. Ct of App., Case
No. 880491 - CA) and Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981).
Precisely because the trial court abused its discretion, exceeded
the applicable bounds of statutory precedent and applicable rules
of procedure to the detriment of the Defendant, the ruling of the
trial court must be reversed and either a proper determination of
the Plaintiff's net equity be made by this Court or this case
should be remanded to the trial court

with clear directives for

proper resolution.
There is another alternative available if this Court:
determines that the trial court and the court of appeals should be
bound by a proper application of Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Specifically, this Court could order the Defendant and
10

the Plaintiff to execute a listing agreement with a licensed real
estate broker conducting business in Salt Lake County, Utah and
order that the marital home be advertised for sale in the Salt Lake
County Multi-listing Directory.

The Defendant has no objections

to being required to do this and would do so immediately if so
ordered by the Court.
There was no requirement that the Defendant convey land
or deliver documents or deeds. Nor was there any requirement that
the specific act required of the Defendant was to pay the Plaintiff
the sum of eleven thousand nine hundred fifty one dollars sixty
cents ($11,951.60) as her share of the net equity in the jointly
owned

former

marital

home.

Absent

any

of

these

specific

requirements, reliance upon Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure to justify the judgment of the trial court, which is the
subject of this appeal, is erroneous.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN COMPUTING PLAINTIFF'S NET

INTEREST IN THE PARTIES' RESIDENCE.
It is correct that no listing agreement was ever executed
with a licensed real estate broker operating in Salt Lake County,
Utah nor was the partiesf home ever advertised in the Salt Lake
County Multi-listing Directory.

However, to assume that this is

the fault of the Defendant is to ignore the facts and to ignore the
interactions between these parties.
Plaintiff

to

execute

a listing

The Defendant did ask the

agreement.

The

Plaintiff's

representation to the Defendant was that she would refuse to do so
based upon advice of counsel who had informed her that she had no
11

obligation to execute a listing agreement as she was not a record
owner of the property.

However, when the Defendant spoke with a

local real estate broker he was informed that the listing agreement
would have to be signed by both the Plaintiff and the Defendant
before the home could be listed for sale and marketed.

The

Defendant should not and cannot be penalized for matters that he
could not control.
The Plaintiff has totally failed to address several
issues raised by the Defendant in challenging the amount of net
equity determined by Commissioner Peuler.
agrees with those matters not refuted.
indicated

a

willingness

to

totally

It is presumed she

The Defendant has never
absorb

the

real

estate

commissions and any other additional costs associated with the
eventual sale of the parties former home.

Moreover, paragraph

seven (7) of the Decree of Divorce does not require that he solely
bear responsibility and liability for these expenses.

If indeed,

the trial court can speculate as to what is the fair market value
of the home and can speculate as to what the Plaintiff's net equity
interest in the home is, it certainly could deduce what would be
one half of the statutorily allowable real estate commissions if
the property were sold at the price determined by the court to be
the fair market value of the property.

These costs should have

been equally borne by the parties and should have been subtracted
from the airounts allegedly due the Plaintiff.
The

Plaintiff

also

fails

to

rebut

the

Defendant's

contention that at a minimum there was an additional five thousand
12

six hundred dollars ($5,600.00) which should have been deducted
from the speculative market price of the parties1 home.

Both

appraisers identified several other repairs and improvements that
each felt would have to be done to the property before it could be
sold.

The parties, because of their

past experiences with

relocation companies, knew that additional

costs and

repairs

referenced by appraisers were deducted by the relocation company
when issuing settlement checks upon purchase of the relocated
empoyee's property.

The additional five thousand six hundred

dollars ($5,600.00) in repairs and improvements certainly was not
going to be eaten nor borne by the relocation company. Rather, the
relocation company would in this instance, as it had done to
parties in the past, deduct the costs of anticipated repairs and
improvements.
The trial court made absolutely no deduction for the
known costs of additional repairs as cited by the appraisers. This
clearly was erroneous and contrary to paragraph seven (7) of the
Decree of Divorce.

Commissioner Peuler had an opportunity to

review all of the figures presented by the parties.

She made

errors in calculating the equity allegedly due and owing the
Plaintiff.

Counsel for the Defendant does not believe that Judge

Moffat carefully reviewed the figures or information given to him
by the parties.

After submitting the Defendant's brief, counsel

for the Defendant learned that Judge Moffat had issued a ruling in
another case almost simultaneously with his blanket, rubber-stamp
approval of Commissioner Peulerfs recommendations in this case.
13

It appears that Judge Moffat had two cases under advisement with
similar names. Not only did Judge Moffat have Hager v. Hager, this
case under consideration he also had under consideration a case
entitled Hagen v. Hagen, Civil No. 764921378, Appeals No. 900114 CA. Discussions with one of the attorneys in the Hagen matter and
a comparison of the issues in Hagen and Hager indicate that it is
quite likely that Judge Moffat confused the two cases.

This

possible confusion was unfortunate and may have necessitated two
appeals to this Court.

III. DEFENDANT WAS NOT GRANTED AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
ANY IRREGULARITIES IN THE PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT WAIVED BY THE
DEFENDANT.
Admittedly, there

is no

record

of the events

transpired in Judge Moffatfs chambers on October 17, 1989.

that
It is

also admitted that recollection of the events are subjective.
However, the Defendant and his counsel have attempted

to be

extremely factual, objective and accurate in recounting the events.
Counsel for the Defendant does not recall Judge Moffat indicating
that there was opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to
convening another matter which was scheduled for the morning of
October 17, 1989.

It is her recollection that there was no time

for the evidentiary hearing and it was the Judge's indication that
the best he could do A?as to allow the parties to make brief
proffers of their argument prior to having to formally convene
Court on the other matrer.

There was no time to discuss what the
14

documentary

evidence, which was submitted

to the Court would

verify. Nor was there time for the Defendant to produce additional
documentation in his possession.
allowed

a

brief

opportunity

to

Counsel for the parties were
summarize

their

positions.

Thereafter, Judge Moffat indicated that he would take the matter
under advisement and review the submitted documentation.
Counsel for the Defendant did object to the fact that
there would be no evidentiary hearing in this matter.

She also

pointed out to the Court that her client had traveled, at his
expense, from California to attend an evidentiary hearing.

It

would be difficult for him to come back to Utah for a later hearing
particularly when Judge Moffat could not be specific about how soon
an evidentiary hearing could be held. Moreover, the Defendant and
Counsel was reluctant to press very strenuously

for a later

evidentiary hearing as she and the Defendant were fearful that they
would make an adverse impression upon the Judge who had clearly
indicated that it was his preference and policy not to have an
evidentiary hearing and who had clearly indicated that he had very
little time for this matter.
It is absolutely erroneous for the Plaintiff to conclude
"An evidentiary hearing would not have produced more information
for the trial court to consider and would have protracted the
hearing

without

significant

benefit

to

either

party."

The

Defendant had additional documentation and significant testimony
which he wished to present which refuted the allegations made by
the Plaintiff that he had refused to list the home for sale, that
15

the negotiations with Merrill Lynch had concluded anytime prior to
May

4,

1989

and

that

the

Commissioner were erroneous.

equity

calculations

made

by

the

He also wished the Court to rule on

the issues of the requested removal of the Plaintiff's lis pendens
and the contractual obligations of the parties to each pay one half
of the monthly mortgage. The absence of an evidentiary hearing and
the probable confusion of two similarly named cases absolutely
impacted the Defendant detrimentally.

Perhaps an evidentiary

hearing would have precluded the need for an appeal.
The Defendant and counsel did state objections to the
lack of an evidentiary hearing and expressed disappointment at
Judge Moffat's explanation. This issue is not being raised for the
first time on appeal.
The

Plaintiff

and

her

counsel

have

deliberately

misinterpreted and misconstrued a statement made by the attorney
for the Defendant in her Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to
Motion in Limone to Strike Hearing and to Impose Sanctions for
Payment of Attorney's Fees, which is dated Novemoer 17, 1989. This
statement was made in response to a completely separate matter
which is not the subject of this appeal.
question whether or not he should
hearing.

The Defendant did

be granted

an evidentiary

However, being pragmatic and not wishing to upset the

Judge on October 17, 1989 no aggressive or obnoxiously strenuous
objection was made.

Rather, a pragmatic decision was made to

follow the clear indication of the trial judge as to what he wished
the parties to do.

The statement "At no time has the Defendant
16

questioned either the procedures utilized by the Court or the
authority of the Court,"

refers to an acknowledgement by the

Defendant and counsel that Judge Moffat had the final word when it
came to deciding whether conflicts would be resolved by evidentiary
hearing or proffers of testimony.

Moreover, this statement is an

acknowledgement that an evidentiary hearing had been scheduled but
was canceled and the Court "suggested" an alternative means of
resolving the issues.

To indicate that no objection to the lack

of an evidentiary hearing was made by the Defendant or his attorney
is erroneous.

Plaintiff and counsel were present in chambers and

clearly heard a reiterated request for an evidentiary hearing to
be held on October 17, 1989 and disappointment and objection to
the fact that no evidentiary hearing could be held unless it was
scheduled

at

some

date

in

the

future

(the

inference

and

understanding being that the future date would be quite a while in
the future), and that the rescheduling of the evidentiary hearing
would be at significant cost to the Defendant.

It is absolutely

untenable that the Plaintiff and her counsel would misconstrue an
affidavit filed by counsel in an unrelated matter and attempt to
relate it back to events that transpired on October 17, 1989.
The Defendant and Counsel were aware, on October 17,
1989, that should the decision rendered by Judge Moffat after
review of the submitted documents could still be contrary to
paragraph seven (7) of the Decree of Divorce and detrimental to the
Defendant, and
final Order.

that the Defendant had a right to appeal from the

This right to appeal was never waived.
17

Nor was the

right to address any issue on appeal ever waived.

Moreover, it is

important to realize that given the exigencies of the situation,
although objection to the lack of an evidentiary hearing was made,
the same was not vociferously
including

the

lack

of

time

argued

to

do

for pragmatic reasons,

so

and

fear

of

adverse

repercussions.

IV.

DEFENDANT DID PERFECT HIS RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS

AT THE TRIAL LEVEL AND THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER ANY STATEMENTS
OR CLAIMS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
The Plaintiff and her attorney assert that many of the
assertions and arguments made by the Defendant in his brief and on
appeal are not supported by the record. However, these contentions
are

absolutely

inaccurate.

Each

reference

made

to

any

documentation or arguments advanced by the Defendant at either
Order to Show Cause hearing or before Judge Moffat are clearly
referred to and each document referred to is clearly identified.
Additionally, each document identified by the Defendant in his
brief has been reproduced and incorporated into the Defendant's
brief and was submitted either at one of the Order to Show Cause
hearings or to Judge Moffat on October 17, 1989.
It is absolutely

preposterous

for the Plaintiff to

continue asserting that the Defendant did not list the home for
sale with Merrill Lynch Realty Relocation.

If the Defendant did

not list the home for sale then the following events would not have
transpired:
18

1.

Leo Tyson would not have been assigned to be the
relocation coordinator.

2.

Appraisals would not have been done on the home.

3.

Inspections of the home would not have been done.

4.

An offer to purchase the home would not have been
made.

5.

Negotiations for the sale of the home to Merrill
Lynch Realty Relocation would not have transpired.

The only means that the relocation company had to even commence
negotiations with the parties, much less to eventually offer to
purchase their home, was triggered by the initial contact by the
Defendant and the agreement made to list the home with the
relocation company for purchase. Documentation of the transactions
between the Defendant and the relocation company are numerous and
have been submitted to this Court and the trial court.
Contrary to the assertions made by the Plaintiff, the
record does establish that the Plaintiff was
residence with the Defendant.

a co-owner of the

The documentation to support the

joint tenancy of the parties are all of the closing documents from
the parties1 original purchase of the home in 1981, the Deed of
Trust, and the documents evidencing the parties' financing of the
home.

Likewise, the documents obtained by the Defendant and the

letters from counsel for the Plaintiff to the representative of the
relocation company do demonstrate that the Plaintiff had not signed
any of the documents provided by Merrill Lynch until sometime in
1990.

However, the Defendant also submitted copies of documents

that were blank which the Plaintiff had been requested to sign.
19

All of the aforereferenced documents have been submitted to the
lower court and are attachments to the Defendant's brief.
The Defendant did perfect and preserve his record. This
Court should take notice of the Defendant's arguments, review the
supporting documentation, and when properly interpreting the same
order the relief requested by the Defendant in his appeal.

V.

DEFENDANT HAS NOT FAILED TO CITE HIS STATEMENTS OF

FACTS OR ASSERTIONS TO THE RECORD ON APPEAL AND THE TRIAL COURT'S
JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE PRESUMED CORRECT.
Sophie Orvin, Commissioner Peuler's clerk executed an
affidavit which was filed with the Court Appeals verifying that
there was no transcribed record or oral record of the second Order
to Show Cause Proceeding before Commissioner Peuler.

It would be

impossible for the Defendant to make reference to this transcript
in his reply brief as one cannot refer to a thing which is not in
existence.

However, the Defendant did make reference to his

arguments and the documents submitted to both Commissioner Peuler
and

Judge Moffat.

Each

of the

arguments

are

supported

by

documents. The documents are incorporated in the Defendant's brief
and were submitted at either the Order to Show Cause hearing or the
hearing held before Judge Moffat on October 17, 1989.

Adequate

reference to the record has been made in Defendant's brief.

Any

allegation antithetical to this is erroneous and specious.
There is no reason for the Court to affirm the trial
court's judgement because of the Defendant's alleged failure to
20

support his factual assertions by reference to the record on
appeal.

Conversely, there is ample documentary evidence which

mandates this Court affirm the relief sought by the Defendant.

VI.

DEFENDANT'S APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS AND PLAINTIFF

SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED ATTORNEYf S FEES, COSTS AND DAMAGES ON APPEAL.
The Defendant has not ever attempted to delay resolution
of a proper interpretation of the Decree of Divorce nor has he ever
purposely been dilatory in any of his actions.

Nor has the

Defendant ever engaged in a frivolous post-litigation action. The
converse cannot be said of the Plaintiff. Sometime ago counsel for
the Defendant suggest to counsel for the Plaintiff that all of the
post-litigation issues pending, either in a modification proceeding
or the Order to Show Cause proceeding initiated by the Defendant,
be consolidated for resolution at either a meeting between the
parties and their counsel or at one evidentiary hearing to be
scheduled

before

Judge

Moffat.

Counsel

for

the

Plaintiff

categorically rejected these suggestions and made it necessary for
the Defendant to institute separate post-litigation proceedings.
As an example of the alleged dilatory tactics of the
Defendant the Plaintiff and her attorney site the Defendant's
unwillingness

to stipulate to an amendment

Domestic Relations Order.

of the Qualified

If the Court will carefully read the

submission tendered by the Plaintiff at the first Order to Show
Cause

hearing

they

will

note

that

the

Defendant

had

valid

objections to allowing an amended Qualified Domestic Relations
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Order to be entered.

He did not object to any correction of a

typographical error, but he objected to an interpretation as to the
amounts of money the Plaintiff was entitled to as her participation
in his retirement plans.

The documentation submitted by the

Defendant shows that the Plaintiff was requesting that she be given
one half (1/2) of the accumulated book value of his retirement
plans although there was an outstanding loan taken out by the
parties against the retirement account and the Decree of Divorce
stipulated that the Plaintiff was awarded an interest in the cash
value of the retirement fund. (Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs1
Order to Show Cause)
It is correct that there are several post-litigation
matters pending at the trial court level.

However, these actions

were necessitated because the Stipulation and Decree of Divorce are
ambiguous and because the Plaintiff and her counsel have refused,
on numerous occasions, to meet with the Defendant and attempt to
informally resolve these matters. Additionally, the Defendant can
document that the Plaintiff received the proceeds from the sale of
a significant block of stock to which she was not entitled.

He is

attempting to recover the monies wrongfully paid by the stock
transfer company to the Plaintiff.
The Defendant has diligently pursued resolution of these
proceedings.

However, as noted in Exhibit "R" of the Plaintiff's

brief, which is a letter dated February 2, 1990 to Judge Moffat by
counsel for the Defendant it is noted that Judge Moffat indicated
he would grant the parties an evidentiary hearing of forty (40)
22

minutes duration on issues raised by the Defendant in his Order to
Show Cause.

Counsel for the Defendant has indicated to Judge

Moffat and to his clerk that a forty

(40) minute evidentiary

hearing is insufficient to accommodate the anticipated testimony
and she has requested that this matter be scheduled when more time
is available. Additionally, the Defendant has been working almost
simultaneously on projects in California and Massachusetts. He has
been doing a considerable amount of traveling back and forth
between the east coast and west coast.

Judge Moffat's clerk has

not notified counsel for the Defendant that there has been a half
day setting available.

Even assuming that a half day setting did

become available it would be difficult, if not impossible to
coordinate the same with the Defendant's work assignments.
This litigation and all of the post-litigations are
attributable

to

an

extremely

ambiguous

document

drafted

by

Plaintiff and her counsel, overreaching by the Plaintiff, who has
attempted to be awarded assents and relief to which she clearly is
not entitled, and the fact that a no longer naive or trusting
Defendant

is now cognizant of his legal rights and

extremely

aware of the ongoing complications

created

is also
by the

ambiguous Stipulation and Decree of Divorce which must be resolved
so that this Divorce can be finished. Not only has this appeal and
the

other

post-divorce

litigations

been

time

consuming

and

expensive for the Defendant, they have also caused him a great deal
of emotional stress and pain. It was his hope and desire (some of
which flickers) that after the Divorce he and his estranged wife
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could remain friends not only because they have children together
but because he does still care for her.
This appeal is not frivolous. The only reason that the
Plaintiff alleges it is frivolous is because she has not received
the monies she wants and she has not been able to impose her will
upon the Defendant.
and fact in dispute.
responsibilities

The are legitimate and genuine issues of law
The Decree of Divorce is silent as to the

of the parties

to pay

the monthly

mortgage

payments subsequent to September 30, 1988. The Defendant contends
that the Decree is silent on this issue because the parties were
to split the mortgage payments once the alimony payments to the
Plaintiff began.

The Plaintiff contends that the intent of the

parties was to have the Defendant bear the sole responsibility for
the ongoing monthly mortgage payments while she continued to ignore
her contractual obligations with the mortgage holder, and while she
continued to reap the benefit of the accrued appreciation and
equity.

Only an evidentiary hearing before Judge Moffat or a

ruling from this Court interpreting paragraph seven (7) of the
Decree of Divorce will put the issue at rest. Neither Commissioner
Peuler nor Judge Moffat allowed the Defendant to fully explore this
issue and seek resolution of the ambiguity.
Additionally, there is a genuine issue on appeal as to
whether or not the equity could or should be awarded to the
Plaintiff prior to the time the parties1 marital home was sold.
Likewise, there is a genuine issue as to the amount of equity that
should have been awarded to the Plaintiff if indeed it was proper
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to award equity to the Plaintiff prior to a sale of the home.
These are but a few of the issues identified by the Defendant and
argued on appeal.

None of them are frivolous.

None of them were

properly addressed by the lower court. All of them have merit and
need resolution.
appeal frivolous.

This Court should not declare the Defendant's
Nor should it award attorney's fees, costs or

"damages" to the Plaintiff.

CONCLUSION
The Defendant's substantive and procedural rights were
clearly

violated

by the lower court.

Commissioner

Peuler's

recommendation and the Order entered by Judge Moffat affirming the
recommendation were violative of the terms of the Decree of
Divorce, are an impermissible modification and amendment of the
Decree of Divorce, and cannot be supported either as conforming to
precedence established in other cases nor good law.

The decision

of the lower court wrongfully penalizes the Defendant for things
he has been accused of but did not do.

Not only is Defendant

penalized by an erroneous finding that he failed to list the
parties' marital home for sale, the lower court's decision goes
further in being punitive as it wrongfully deprives the Defendant
of monies that he does not owe the Plaintiff.
Moreover, The Plaintiff's assertion and argument that the
lower court's decision is properly within the scope of Rule 70 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is patently specious.

The

Defendant was never required to tender to the Plaintiff the stated
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sum of money within a stated period of time to extinguish her
equity

interest in the home.

Rather, the Defendant and the

Plaintiff were ordered to list the home for sale and to divide the
net sale proceeds realized when the home was sold to a third party
bona fide purchaser.

Until the home is sold there is no money due

and owing the Plaintiff. As the Plaintiff is adamant that the home
be sold then she can be empowered to sell it. Alternatively, she
can wait for the Defendant to sell the home, which he will do when
a listing agreement that is satisfactory to the listing agent can
be executed.

Unless and until the proper equity calculation is

made and/or sales proceeds are actually realized the Defendant
continues to be penalized and his rights continue to be negated.
It is absolutely mandated both by the terms of paragraph seven (7)
of the Decree of Divorce and by controlling case law that this
matter be remanded for an evidentiary hearing or that this Court
make

a

proper

determination

of

the

respective

rights

and

obligations of the parties.

Respectfully submitted on this 20th day of August, 1990.

CarolynJ3riscoll
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that four (4) true and
correct copies of the Appellant's Reply Brief were mailed postage
prepaid on August 20, 1990 to Kenneth M. Hisatake, the attorney for
the Plaintiff/Respondent, 1825 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84105.
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